A Lonely Fight for Myanmar’s Democracy; Ongoing Atrocities and Inaction by the International Community
Rachel Manson [Masters Student of International Development Law and Human Rights (LLM) ]
At the United Nations 55th Human Rights Council meeting, Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar called for the attention and action of the UN including the Security Council on the ongoing atrocity crimes committed by the junta. The junta, otherwise known as the State Administration Council (SAC, Tatmadaw), has acquired sophisticated military weapons obtained from abroad in their armed conflict against ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and independent democratic forces. Despite recent reports of the weakened military junta and the fight on multiple borders and enclaves, the past five months has seen a five-fold increase in airstrikes against civilian targets. Two-point-four million civilians have been displaced, with one million expected in the near future. Andrews, state parties and CSOs have called on the International Criminal Court to refer to the situation in Myanmar to the Prosecutor of the ICC under Article 14 of the Rome Statute and demanded for an open investigation.
Statements initially released were largely from Western, liberal democracies and international institutions part of a ‘rule-based international order.’ Markedly, any statements and responses (including sanctions) we have seen thus far failed to bring about change, with minimal impact on the military which has gotten used to “learn to walk with only few friends” as uttered by deputy commander-in-chief, Soe Win. The UNSC was unable to mandate a general arm embargo due to China and Russia’s veto power, although a non-binding resolution to prevent flow of arms to Myanmar was passed on the 18th of June 2021 by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). With ongoing military links to China and Russia, the arms embargo is ineffective as ‘the Myanmar military produces almost all of the light arms and ammunition it needs…’.
Civil society organisations, regional governmental organisations, and states have been outspoken or at least implicit in their rejection of the junta’s power. Only a few states such as China and Russia remain neutral to an extent, collaborating with the state without offering significant political support to either side. China’s interest lies in expectations of limited disruptions to its investments in infrastructure projects. Within the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been delegated a role (implicitly by the UN) to provide any potential national solution. However, due to the junta’s violation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, support and proactive measures have been limited- with neither the SAC or National Unity Government (representing the ousted, democratic government) officially open to bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, the public in Myanmar believes in a non-negotiation strategy to combat the junta, indicating a rift with the international community (i.e. ASEAN), which prefers negotiations between the junta and elected bodies to ensure a transfer of power followed by internal stability.
Within the international stage, it becomes clear that international actors have delegated to denounce the junta or SAC- without recognising the grave role of armed groups (whether ethnic or democracy-based); the ethnic diversity of the state; and cleavages within the country. This is seen by some observers to overlook alternative opportunities by international actors to gain leverage against the coup’s stability and momentum. The plurality of actors involved in Myanmar’s civil war and resistance movement is often neglected by major international actors- due to their discomfort with such organisations’ ill-fit into the mould of liberal democratic models. In this context, the international community and global-based civil society and inter-governmental organisations appears to embrace the neo-Tocequevillian approach ‘that sees civil society as a domain of liberal values and NGOs outside organised politics’ – with institutionalised CSOs embracing the ‘professional’, ‘apolitical’ and ‘autonomous’ imaginations of its role. This is ill-fitting to the needs and desires of Burmese civil society’s current developments, which embraces popular movements, and advocates for political inclusion and pro-democracy.
Those critical of the violence against civilians, human right violations by the state, and opposed to the coup should ideally provide material and symbolic support, recognising EAOs as ‘political actors’ as well and ‘providers of social services.’ However, the international community has been reluctant to not only formally recognise the NUG, but also to provide weapons to support the armed resistance. There has never been any suggestion of international intervention, as the crisis was deemed confined to Myanmar. It thus appears that any measures taken thus far, whether statements or sanctions, serves to “provide the moral high ground to those imposing them” though “ineffectual” as stated by Myanmar specialist David Steinberg.
Despite some support from Russia and China, the junta faces continued and strengthened armed resistance throughout the country. With claims of more than 10,000 military defections since the coup and increasing Tatmadaw casualties, the ongoing crackdown on civil society and protesters have devastated consumer and investor confidence. The current administration is thus described as endorsing a foreign policy reflecting ‘negative neutralism for group survival’ with efforts made to eliminate domestic strife.
As evident through the responses of civil society and EAOs, any calls by the international community to ‘save Myanmar’ were reacted by feelings of frustration and anger at the UN and the international actors themselves invoking it. Without impact and help, the Burmese appears to have realised the limits to the ability of international responses to the military coup, and thus come to the conclusion that only civil society itself may challenge the state. This has led to the (further) politicisation and radicalisation of civil society in Myanmar which continues to be subject to military repression. In the state of closed autocracy, the resistance movements have seen severe limitations in respect of the CSOs capacity, as well as of opposition forces and insurgencies. Resilience is vital.